Quotes from caselaw 6: HRH The Duchess of Sussex v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 1810- Megan Markle successful in defending appeal by Mail on Sunday

An appeal against the finding for summary judgment for her misuse of private information and copyright claim.

The appellant was granted permission appealed the elements of the case on seven grounds:

i) The new evidence issue: Whether the new evidence provided by each of the
parties should be admitted.

ii) The nature of the attack issue: Whether the judge mistakenly failed to
recognise the significance and importance of the People Article’s attack on Mr
Markle.

iii) The reasonable expectation of privacy issue: Whether the judge adopted a
flawed analysis of the factors undermining the Duchess’s alleged reasonable
expectation of privacy.

iv) The appropriate test issue: Whether the judge wrongly stated the test, by
suggesting that the defendant had to justify an interference with the claimant’s
right of privacy, when the proper approach was to balance the competing article 8 and 10 rights.

v) The right of reply issue: Whether the judge wrongly applied a strict test of
necessity and proportionality to Mr Markle’s right of reply to the People Article.

vi) The public interest/article 10 copyright issue: whether the judge failed
properly to evaluate the interference with article 10, saying that it would be a
rare case in which freedom of expression would outweigh copyright.


vii) The fair dealing copyright issue: whether the judge wrongly relied on his
privacy analysis to reject the fair dealing defence to breach of copyright, bearing
in mind the limited scope of the copyright in the Letter and the wide scope of
the concept of reporting current events.

The Sir Jeoffery Vos decided against the defendant on all grounds dismissing the appeal, in a unanimous judgment, stating summarily:

Essentially, whilst it might have been proportionate to disclose and publish a very small part of the Letter to rebut inaccuracies in the People Article, it was not necessary to deploy half the contents of the Letter as Associated Newspapers did. As the Articles themselves demonstrate, and as the judge found, the primary purpose of the Articles was not to publish Mr Markle’s responses to the inaccurate allegations against him in the People Article. The true purpose of the publication was, as the first 4 lines of the Articles said: to reveal for the first time [to the world] the “[t]he full content of a sensational letter written by [the Duchess] to her estranged father shortly after her wedding”. The contents of the Letter were private when it was written and when it was published, even if the claimant, it now appears, realised that her father might leak its contents to the media.

p.106

ICO issues provisional view to fine Clearview AI Inc over £17 million

The Information Commissioner’s Office (“ICO”) has issued a provisional view of the imposition of a £17m fine over Clearview AI.

The BBC cites that the firms’ database has over 10bn images. The ICO has issued a provisional notice to stop further processing of the personal data of people in the UK and to delete any such data following alleged serious breaches of the UK’s data protection laws.

In a joint investigation with the Australian Information Commissioner (“AIC”) the ICO concluded that the data, some scraped from the internet, was being processed, in the case of UK persons, unlawfully in some instances.

Clearview AI Inc’s services were being used on a free trial basis by some law enforcement agencies. This has been confirmed to no longer be the case.

The ICO’s preliminary view is that Clearview AI Inc appears to have failed to comply with UK data protection laws in several ways including by:

  • failing to process the information of people in the UK in a way they are likely to expect or that is fair;
  • failing to have a process in place to stop the data being retained indefinitely;
  • failing to have a lawful reason for collecting the information;
  • failing to meet the higher data protection standards required for biometric data (classed as ‘special category data’ under the GDPR and UK GDPR);
  • failing to inform people in the UK about what is happening to their data; and
  • asking for additional personal information, including photos, which may have acted as a disincentive to individuals who wish to object to their data being processed.

Information Comissioner Elizabeth Denham commented:

“I have significant concerns that personal data was processed in a way that nobody in the UK will have expected. It is therefore only right that the ICO alerts people to the scale of this potential breach and the proposed action we’re taking. UK data protection legislation does not stop the effective use of technology to fight crime, but to enjoy public trust and confidence in their products technology providers must ensure people’s legal protections are respected and complied with.

Clearview AI Inc’s services are no longer being offered in the UK. However, the evidence we’ve gathered and analysed suggests Clearview AI Inc were and may be continuing to process significant volumes of UK people’s information without their knowledge. We therefore want to assure the UK public that we are considering these alleged breaches and taking them very seriously.”

This is one of the largest fines issued under the GDPR to date. Clearview now has the opportunity to respond, both in the UK and Australia (the AIC has found breaches of Australian privacy laws).

It’s unsurprising that its database, said to have included images scraped from social media, has drawn the attention of regulators. Facial recognition services have been at the forefront of recent data analytics scrutiny and data protection enforceability.

The ICO press release can be found here and the AIC press release here.

The previous statement of the ICO on the conclusion of the joint investigation can be found here.

Quotes from caselaw 4: PJS v News Group Newspapers Limited [2016] UKSC 26 – privacy rights are broader than just confidentiality

It is a rare case where an application for a interlocutory injunction succeeds despite an article on the subject already being published. Such was the case in PJS, one of the most significant English law cases concerning privacy law to date.

The leading judgment was handed down by Lord Mance. It concerned the grant of an injunction to keep details of an extra marital affair between a claimant of great renown being published by the press.

Lord Mance observes the fact that privacy is a zonal right justifying protection, differing in character from the right of confidentiality. The esteemed judge highlights previous cases at paragraphs 58 and 59 of the judgment, endorsing the well entrenched approach from the Court of Appeal.

He characterises privacy, rightly, as extending beyond the bounds of confidentiality. In doing so ones private life becomes a space that should remain, in certain circumstances, free from intrusion.

However, claims based on respect for privacy and family life do not depend on confidentiality (or secrecy) alone... “unwanted access to private information and unwanted access to [or intrusion into] one’s … personal space”

Lord Mance at p.58-59

Concluding Lord Mance opined on the capacity of the internet to change perceptions of privacy. He acknowledged that the courts need to remain cognizant of this. In doing so he affirmed the findings of previous caselaw, gave credence to commentators and noted the implications of tweeting and blogging:

 I also accept that, as many commentators have said, that the internet and other electronic developments are likely to change our perceptions of privacy as well as other matters – and may already be doing so. The courts must of course be ready to consider changing their approach when it is clear that that approach has become unrealistic in practical terms or out of touch with the standards of contemporary society. However, we should not change our approach before it is reasonably clear that things have relevantly changed in a significant and long-term way. In that connection, while internet access became freely available in this country only relatively recently, almost all the cases listed at the end of para 59 above were decided since that happened, and many of those cases were decided after blogging and tweeting had become common.

Lord Mance at p.70

TPP has commented further on the PJS case here.

Citation: INFORRM Blog, ZXC v Bloomberg LP: Privacy and Reputational Harm – Jeevan Hariharan

The INFORRM Blog has an excellent post on the inter-related nature of privacy and reputational harms.

Whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy that outweighs the public interest in cases where there has been an investigation, but no charge, by the police is an imminent case before the Supreme Court in the case of ZXC v Bloomberg LP.

The case is before the UK Supreme Court on 30 November and 1 December next week and was cited by Hariharan in his analysis of the proximity between privacy and reputational harms.

The Court of Appeal judgment can be found here. The Court found that there could be a reasonable expectation of privacy in the fact of a police investigation. This builds upon notable caselaw such as the Cliff Richard case.

TPP number 30 on Feedspot – Top 35 Privacy Websites and Blogs

We are delighted to be ranked 30 out of Feedspots top 35 blogs. TPP was ranked alongside law firms and authoritative blogs on privacy law.

According to Feedspot sites are ranked “by traffic rank, social media followers, domain authority & freshness.” The full list can be found here and is a must read for anyone interested in privacy law matters.

TPP re-published by the The Student Lawyer: Use of facial recognition software in school lunch queues in North Ayrshire

TPP is pleased to announce that the article that appeared on this site analysing use of facial recognition software in schools in North Ayrshire has been republished by the Student Lawyer.

The Student Lawyer is a go-to legal news and blogging site for law students. You can find the article here.

Citation: 5RB: European Court of Human Rights upholds Article 8 privacy breach in relation to reputation of a dead person

In a case builds upon pre-existing caselaw on the rights of those who are deceased the European Court of Human Rights has found an article 8 breach in relation to news articles posted about a deceased Roman Catholic Priest.

ML v Slovakia 34159/17 concerned a number of articles published by three Slovakian newspapers about the historic sex offence convictions of the claimants son.

The Court found that the articles were inaccurate and sensationalist citing that: “However, it follows from what has been said above that the domestic courts failed to carry out a balancing exercise between the applicant’s right to private life and the newspaper publishers’ freedom of expression in conformity with the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law.

Concluding the Courts stated, applying Article 8:

“…dealing appropriately with the dead out of respect for the feelings of the deceased’s relatives falls within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention”.

Furthermore the Court stated a clear and concise view on the journalistic integrity of the reporting: “Although the journalists must be afforded some degree of exaggeration or even provocation, the Court considers that the frivolous and unverified statements about the applicants sons private life must be taken to have gone beyond the limits of responsible journalism” -p.47

5RB has an excellent case comment.

ICO intervenes in nine schools in North Ayrshire which are using facial recognition software to scan faces of pupils in lunch queues

According to the Financial Times and Guardian the ICO is set to intervene in nine schools in North Ayrshire following the discovery that pupils faces were being scanned in lunch queues to take payments.

The ICO commented: 

“Data protection law provides additional protections for children, and organisations need to carefully consider the necessity and proportionality of collecting biometric data before they do so. Organisations should consider using a different approach if the same goal can be achieved in a less intrusive manner. We are aware of the introduction, and will be making inquiries with North Ayrshire council.”

Whilst the company that provides the software argues this a safe way to take payments in the age of covid the question, as the ICO rightly posits, clearly arises as to whether a less invasive method of safely taking payments could be used.

Simple measures such as issuing pupils with lunch cards that they can scan to identify themselves or even with just a unique ID number that could easily be anonymised and aggregated, would just as easily serve this purpose.

Under Article 35 of the GDPR a Data Protection Impact Assessment must be made before this software is used. This would assess whether the use of facial recognition software was a proportionate means for achieving the legitimate aim of securely taking card payments. Aspects such as the retention period of data, storage methods, basis for processing, safeguards and processes for gathering consent must be considered.

Schools should have mechanisms and documentation in place to explain to children the circumstances of this data collection, storage and their rights under the GDPR, including an option to opt out of the data collection. 

Under the GDPR the age where children can consent to the sharing of their personal data in England and Wales is as low as is permissible- thirteen. In Scotland, the location of the schools, the age is lower- at twelve years of age.

Interestingly, North Ayrshire Council indicated that 97% of pupils or their parents had given consent to this process. The Council has temporarily paused the rollout of the software given the ICO’s intervention.

CBR Cumminghams, a company that provides the software, stated that their cameras check pupils faces against encrypted templates, an thus operated differently to “live” facial recognition used by the police to scan for criminal activities, that was challenged in the Bridges case.

A Principal of one of the schools, David Waugh, commented:

“The combined fingerprint and facial recognition system was part of an upgrade to the catering cashless system, so that the time it takes to serve students is reduced, thus giving a better dining experience. However, we will not be using the facial recognition aspect.”

Mischon de Reya has a excellent analysis of these issues, which cover Scotland and are thus outside of TPP’s remit. The BBC also reports on the story.

Quotes from caselaw 3: Fairhurst v Woodard (Case No: G00MK161) – A cautionary tale for neigbours implementing surveillance

I am satisfied that the
extent of range to which these devices can capture audio is well beyond the
range of video that they capture, and in my view cannot be said to be
reasonable for the purpose for which the devices are used by the Defendant,
since the legitimate aim for which they are said to be used, namely crime
prevention, could surely be achieved by something less. A great deal of the
purpose could be achieved without audio at all, as is the case with the bulk
of CCTV systems in use in public places in this country, or by a microphone that only picks up sound within a small diameter of the device.


That finding means that I am satisfied that the processing of such audio
data by the Defendant as data controller is not lawful. The extent of the
range means that personal data may be captured from people who are not
even aware that the device is there, or that it records and processes audio
personal data, or that it can do so from such a distance away, in breach of
the first principle.”

Melissa Clarke HHJ. at p.137

In Fairhurst a neighbour complained that use of several cameras, including a Ring doorbell, amounted to nusiance, harassment and breach of the Data Protection Act 2018.

The claims of harassment and data protection succeeded. It was, in particular, noted that the audio recording capabilities of the devices were much broader in than the video recording capability. As the above quote shows, the extent processing of the audio recording data was such that it was unlawful under data protection laws.

The audio recording capability of the Ring device extended 40-68ft (12-20m).

Amazon released a statement following the finding in the case: “We strongly encourage our customers to respect their neighbours’ privacy and comply with any applicable laws when using their Ring product.”

The case serves as a cautionary tale for those seeking to implement surveillance around their homes that impinge upon their neighbours.

INFORRM has an excellent case comment for interested readers. As does the Guardian.

Quotes from caselaw 2: Sicri v Assocated Newspapers [2020] EWHC 3541 (QB) – Privacy and suspicion by the state

The rationale for the general rule, that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of information that they have come under suspicion by the state, is clear: disclosure of such information is likely to have a seriously harmful impact on the person’s reputation, and thus their private life.

Warby J. at p.55

The Sicri case concerned the publication of an article by the Mail Online following the arrest of a man for having a connection with Manchester Arena suicide bomber Salman Abedi. The Mail Online did not remove the article after the claimants’ release and divulged his name via an alternative spelling, address and other identifiable details.  The claimant was successful and awarded £83,000 in damages as he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of his identity remaining private when his arrest was reported. It should be noted that this reasonable expectation was assessed at pre-charge stage.

The claimant had a right to expect that the defendant would not publish his identity as the 23-year-old man arrested on suspicion of involvement in the Manchester Arena bombing. By 12:47 on 29 May 2017, the defendant had violated that right; it had no, or no sufficient public interest justification for identifying the claimant. It continued to do so. Later, another publisher did the same or similar. But the claimant’s right to have the defendant respect his privacy was not defeated or significantly weakened by the fact that others failed to do so. He is entitled to compensation. The appropriate sum is £83,000 in general and special damages.

Warby J. at 190

This is part of our new “quotes from caselaw” series, looking to bring you short snippets from leading judgments on privacy, which highlight its importance and development.