An excellent piece on recent developments in phone hacking cases- a consideration of the News of the World litigation settlements by Brian Cathcart
An excellent and highly insightful piece written by Hugh Tomlinson QC on the application of the Article 8 right to privacy and a reconciliation with domestic law.
The Article 8 right to respect for private life has many facets and has often seemed in danger of uncontrolled expansion. The Court of Human Rights has often noted that private life is “not susceptible to exhaustive definition”, embracing “multiple aspects of the person’s physical and social identity”.
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From the hallmark case of Campbell and the development of breach of privacy as an action, it is clear that the integration of privacy as a concept in English law is still in its formative years. In Part III we consider some of the significant cases post-Campbell to date, bringing into relief key issues and developments in privacy law, many of which are ongoing or merit further consideration by the courts. In particular, the broad nature of an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy becomes clear (covering issues of children’s privacy and biometric data retention) and the degree to which this can be qualified against other rights is explored.
On 29 November 2018, the Government published its response to the 2013 consultation on costs protection in defamation and privacy claims. In particular, the written statement by the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice summarizes the amendments to costs provisions, raising access to justice concerns.
In short, the Government has decided to implement s.44 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (LAPSO) Act 2012, making claimant lawyers success fees under conditional fee agreements (“CFAs”) unrecoverable from defendants in defamation and privacy cases commencing 6 April 2019. The consolation is that after-the-event insurance (“ATE”) fees remain recoverable. This article considers how these changes perpetuate imperfect solutions that harm access to justice.
In Part II we consider the legislative framework under English law which enshrined privacy and the recent development of the action for misuse of private information, underpinned by privacy as a value.
The right to privacy was codified into legislation at European Union level in the European Convention of Human Rights, which provides a higher level interpretive layer of guidance on the application of such rights. However, these provisions required integration into English law via legislation to be effective. In taking the lead from the European authorities Parliament passed the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”) to achieve such harmonisation. Article 8 of the HRA addresses the right to a private life:
- Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
- There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
This article is meant to illustrate the development of the concept of privacy under English law, is by no means exhaustive and provides a general reference to key developments.
Many doctrines under English law form due to common law, also known as judge-made or case law, where a series of legal cases create and form doctrines or principles which underpin legal rights. Privacy emerged as a notion in common law in the 18th century, developing through cases, until it was legislated in the 20th century under the European Convention on Human Rights, which was integrated into English law by the Human Rights Act 1998. In Part I we explore the early common law cases which introduced the concept of privacy to English law.
Many of you will be familiar with Lord Hain’s recent naming of Sir Phillip Green as the beneficiary of a recent successful application for an interim injunction. The interim injunction prohibited the Daily Telegraph and other outlets from naming Green as the subject of a number of extremely serious allegations in the course of his work as a business executive. However, Lord Hain later named Sir Green openly in the House of Lords.
This piece will seek to focus on the inappropriate use of parliamentary privilege to disclose information which would otherwise have been subject to an interim injunction. Continue reading