This article explores the framework for artifical intelligence regulation put in place by the EU AI Act
Introduction
The race to harness, and some may say exploit, Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) is gathering pace globally. This drive comes in tandem with the rise of public recognition and interest in AI. The European Union (“EU”) is no doubt using its significance in the international economy to mould the digital space. Its ‘Digital Strategy’ has witnessed the introduction of new laws, the latest of which is the EU AI Act.
The following analysis will attempt to show that the EU, and other significant economies, are balancing a myriad of public-policy and economic considerations when regulating AI.
This article will proceed in four parts. Part I provides the context in which the AI Act fits within the EU’s Digital Strategy, offering comparisons with regulatory efforts in the United States. Part II will outline the key provisions of the AI Act and the context in which the legislation fits within the EU’s Digital Strategy. Part III will explore the consequences and criticisms of the AI Act. Part IV will offer concluding remarks, noting the opportunities presented to the UK either to integrate the provisions of the AI Act or diverge from the EU regulatory framework. The analysis presented will demonstrate that the EU AI Act contains shortfalls for the consumer, and that the UK should diverge from its stultifying regulatory framework in favour of a sector-specific, pro-innovation model.
Regulators are walking a legal and economic tightrope with regards to AI. The framework offered in the EU’s AI Act is one option, whereas the UK could diverge by implementing business- and consumer-friendly rules.
Part I: CONTEXT
The EU’s AI Act serves part of its ‘Digital Strategy’, providing a new regulatory framework for the digital and IT sectors of the economy. Notably, GDPR 2018 was the genesis of an attempt to provide comprehensive digital regulation. GDPR provided the global benchmark for data protection – the UK retained this law after exiting the EU.
The Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, proposed an approach for the “human and ethical” consequences of AI development in 2019. Whilst the draft text has been subject to debate and consultations, the EU has passed other laws regarding the digital economy. The Digital Services Act (“DSA”) and the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”) of 2022 are widely viewed as innovative pieces of legislation to regulate digital marketspaces as well as online search engines.
The USA, the country most influential in AI development, has a patchier legal framework. Its Algorithmic Accountability Act represents, comparatively, a light-touch approach and is adapted to the current agency regulatory authority. It is notable that the EU takes a more ‘risk-based approach’ to the regulation of AI and technology. Further, the legislative efforts of the EU, particularly the DSA and DMA, reflect a broader European consensus regarding search engines and e-commerce, aspects that the US Congress has barely debated.
Legislative responses from lawmakers across the globe are microcosms of the wider academic, economic and moral debates regarding AI. For some, AI bore the mark of Cain from the beginning: threatening mass surveillance, economic dislocation, and political destabilisation. For others, it presents a great opportunity, being the vehicle of a new industrial revolution. The more moderate view aims to harness the opportunities of AI whilst managing potential risks. Regarding these potential risks, Mark Coeckelbergh notes the material risks of AI development, whereas Jack Balkin discusses the immaterial risks, such as the impact of AI on free speech.
Part II: CONTENT AND FURTHER CONTEXT
The EU’s AI Act, derived from Article 14 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), creates a new framework for the use and development of AI in the EU. The act seeks to create a regulatory framework that can couch AI within the pre-existing system of rights and protections for consumers and citizens, involving the protection of free speech, the right to privacy and various rule-of-law considerations.
Defining AI
The AI Act adopts, more or less, the OECD definition of AI. Article 3(1) provides the five requirements of an AI system; being:
[1] a “machine-based system”;
[2] designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy;
[3] [that] may exhibit adaptiveness after deployment, and that,
[4] for explicit or implicit objectives, infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs; [and]
[5] that can influence physical or virtual environments.
The terminology is deliberately broad in order to cast the widest net. These provisions seek to encompass ‘Predictive Artificial Intelligence’ (“PredAI”) and ‘Generative Artificial Intelligence’ (“GAI”). The former is commonly used in various industries to improve efficiencies, whereas the latter is used to create new media by synthesising pre-existing data (OpenAI and ChatGPT are good examples of GAI).
The legislation provides diverging regulatory frameworks according to the categorisation of the AI system. There is a four-fold taxonomy:
• Prohibited AI practices;
• High-risk AI systems;
• Certain AI systems with a transparency risk;
• Minimal or no risk systems.
1. Prohibited AI Practices
Taking each in turn, prohibited AI practices as stipulated in Article 5(1) of the AI Act concern eight key scenarios. Where an AI system possesses or employs:
• subliminal techniques;
• a capability to exploit a natural person’s vulnerabilities;
• characteristics of ‘social scoring’;
• the classification of persons for crime prediction “based solely off profiling”;
• capability for expanding facial recognition databases;
• an ability to infer emotions;
• an ability to generate biometric databases; or
• real-time biometric identification in publicly accessible places for purposes of law enforcement;
then it will be prohibited from the EU.
Realistic examples of prohibited practices would be if streaming services used advanced data analytics to generate highly personalised advertisements, or emotionally charged content that could manipulate the user’s feelings. Similarly, an employer or organisation analysing job applicants or assessed behaviour on factors unrelated to job performance would fall foul.
2. High-risk AI systems
Second, if a system is deemed high-risk, it entails essential requirements for its use to continue in the EU. Article 6(1) provides that these regulations apply to AI in two situations: first, where the system is the product of, or safety component of, or is covered under harmonised rules on health and safety; second, an AI system solely for the purpose of fixed areas such as the operation of critical infrastructure, education and vocational training, or law enforcement. AI systems under the high-risk category are exempted from additional regulatory requirements where, per Article 6(3), the system does not pose “a significant risk of harm to the health, safety or fundamental rights of natural persons”.
To comply with the requirements of the AI Act, high-risk AI systems must undertake the following steps:
• Comply with standards regarding ‘accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity’ (Article 15) – the provision merely states that the Commission shall co-operate with benchmarking authorities;
• make a ‘quality management system’ (Article 17);
• maintain documentation to show compliance (Article 18);
• undergo a conformity assessment to determine whether the additional requirements have been met and conform to criteria of various, unspecified ‘harmonised standards’ (Articles 32 and 40);
• in some circumstances, particularly the use of real-time biometric identification in publicly accessible spaces, a fundamental rights impact assessment (FRIA) will be needed.
3. Transparency risk systems
Third, systems deemed to have a ‘transparency risk’ are required to comply with EU requirements on transparency. Article 50 of the AI Act provides that a user must be ‘informed’ that he is interacting with an AI system and whether the output has been generated or manipulated. The key exception is for output used lawfully for the prevention and detection of criminal offences.
4. Minimal or no risk systems
Fourth, systems that do not fall under the previous three categories are deemed minimal or low risk, entailing no obligations from the AI Act. The guidance suggests merely that deployers could adopt additional, voluntary codes of conduct. The idea, and ideal, behind this provision is that most AI systems will fall under this category. Notable examples of AI systems with minimal or no risk include spam filters or AI-enabled recommender systems. The practical distinction between an AI system that is of minimal or no risk compared with the other categories ostensibly concerns the input values used within its function; the former does not use highly personalised information.
Enforcement mechanisms
Aside from the key provisions, the AI Act provides a new method of enforcement; a noticeable development from the GDPR regulations which were criticised for their ostensibly feeble enforcement. At Union level, the AI Office shall develop expertise and capability in the field whilst the EU AI Board will contain representatives of each Member State to enforce the AI Act. Further, each Member State has to establish a market surveillance authority and notifying authority per Article 70(1).
Sanctions
Under Article 99, the AI Act provides a tiered system of penalties for infringements of its provisions. Though obliged to take account of the AI Act’s guidelines, each Member State will establish a penalty system, the latest date of notification for which is 2 August 2026.
The potential maximum penalties contained in the AI Act are higher than other EU laws forming part of the Digital Strategy. Per Article 99(3), the most severe penalty is an administrative fine up to €35 million or seven per cent of total worldwide annual turnover for the preceding financial year; by comparison, the GDPR carries a maximum €20 million fine.
Broadly, the AI Act provides tiers for the maximum administrative fine for particular infringements:
• For prohibited AI practices, the most severe fine may be administered;
• A maximum of €15 million or three per cent annual turnover for breaches of obligations of providers (Article 16); authorised representatives (Article 25); importers (Article 26); distributors (Article 27); deployers (Article 29 (1)-(6)); and notified bodies (Articles 33 and 34);
• €7.5 million or one per cent annual turnover for the supply of incorrect or misleading information to notified bodies and national competent authorities in response to a request;
• For EU Union institutions, up to €1.5 million for non-compliance for prohibited practices, or €750,000 for non-compliance for any requirements or obligations under the Act.
The key criterion binding all Member States in the design of its domestic penalty system is the need for it to be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”, per Article 99(1).
Part III: CONSEQUENCES AND CRITICISM
There are certain aspects of the AI Act that put the consumer and the everyman at the front and centre.
The category of prohibited AI practices sets a benchmark for governments and political organisations globally: the prohibited list provides obligations on the state as to how it may operate the use of AI on its citizens. The AI Act seeks to respond to macro-level considerations for society, particularly security and surveillance. The additional obligations on a high-risk system and the transparency obligations for those of mild risk seek to curtail potential abuses against the user. The regulations provide an important correction to the asymmetry between the developer and the user. Furthermore, the importance of complying with the obligations is boosted by the heavy fines for violating the provisions of the AI Act.
There are, however, pertinent criticisms that one can make of the AI Act.
First, there is a lacuna in the legislation regarding biometric systems; whilst the AI Act bans the use of AI in biometric systems for law enforcement, it does not prevent EU Member States selling biometric data to oppressive regimes, nor does it ban the use of AI in post-factum biometric systems.
Second, the transparency requirements for AI systems are seen as relatively cautious, particularly from an online safety point of view. Yale legal academic, Sandra Watcher, suggests that the AI Act refrains from placing obligations on deployers of ‘high-risk’ systems; rather, most oversight responsibility is placed on market authorities and the large-scale providers. Further, she notes that the requirements for systems containing a ‘transparency risk’ is relatively light touch, particularly as GAI systems can propagate unsavoury content.
Third, the exact scope of harmonised, technical standards for AI product liability remains unclear. This is a pertinent criticism given that there are no guarantees as to what ‘standard’ will be set. The AI Act merely provides that the Commission will issue the requests for standardisation in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 (Article 40, AI Act); this provides that European Standardisation Organisations, AI providers and business agree technical specifications. Currently, the EU is formulating the contents of the Product Liability Directive and the Artificial Intelligence Liability Directive. Hence, the scope and substance of the standards to be adopted may take years to clarify. Substantively, this provision appears to accept an increasing trend in the EU to delegate regulatory decision-making. Unless the Commission were to provide common specifications, private bodies will, in all likelihood, set the standards.
Fourth, the broader criticism of the EU’s Digital Strategy; that it focuses solely on potential risks and less on innovation. The EU has taken the decision to create a distinctive regulatory approach to AI: a tiered regulatory framework to combat perceived material and monetary damage from AI. As stipulated above, the EU has employed macro-level policy considerations as part of a broader Digital Strategy. Investment and deployment decisions will be taken as a result of the EU’s approach; as noted by Nitzberg and Zysman, early regulatory frameworks create enduring trajectories of technological and political economy development. There are fears that the AI Act renders the EU uncompetitive in the race to develop AI, compared with laissez-faire jurisdictions like the UAE.
Aside from the holistic approach provided within the AI Act at present, a sector-specific regulatory approach could be an alternative, balancing the opportunities for innovation with the need to protect consumers and ensure their right to privacy is protected. By developing a corpus of legislation that specifies regulations for different sectors, each sector may establish codes of conduct, ethical principles and technical standards. In the UK, for instance, the different regulatory objectives between healthcare and the Financial Conduct Authority emerge in their approaches to AI: the former is keen to implement AI, ethically, in the diagnostic process, whereas the latter wishes to combat the potential for disadvantaging consumers, given the asymmetric data use between sellers and consumers. The disadvantage of a piecemeal regulatory approach is that it leaves omissions and discrepancies in the legal framework, potentially undermining the objectives of regulators. A hybrid model between the two regulatory approaches is perhaps preferable.
Notably, the AI Act does not appear, prima facie, to harmonise between the obligations of the GDPR and the AI Act. To name a few instances:
• Compared with the GDPR, where all machine-learning systems processing personal data are required to conduct data protection impact assessment (DPIA), the AI Act requires that only high-risk operators conduct the more onerous FRIA;
• Unlike the GDPR where consumers (‘data subjects’) have explicit enforcement mechanisms and regulations regarding the control of their data, AI users are not provided rights under the AI Act;
• Perhaps most strikingly, the AI Act does not contain explicit obligations for data minimisation or requirements for assessing high-risk AI systems to enhance the rights of users.
Factually, the obligations of data protection will likely overlap with the use of AI, whose systems have unprecedented potential to gather and acquire data. With the presence of GDPR, it could be assumed that many GAI platforms have developed in accordance with GDPR. Brown, Truby and Ibrahim note, however, that the inherent properties of many AI systems contradict the principles of GDPR, specifically the use of big data analytics and GDPR requirement for consent. To articulate and enforce the obligations under the AI Act and the GDPR harmoniously, regulators will need to rethink the enforcement of GDPR.
At its best, the law could be used to reap labour market benefits and assess risks. By drawing a line around the invasive aspects of GAI, then the AI Act could reinforce particular liberties that are vulnerable, such as free speech, data protection and the right to private life.
PART IV: THE UK AND CONCLUSION
The UK, now outside of the EU, has no obligation to implement the provisions of the AI Act into domestic law. So far, the UK government’s designated approach is explicitly pro-innovation with light-touch and sector-specific regulations. At the time of writing, there is no intention to introduce a general AI Act into Parliament in the near future.
A light-touch approach has its benefits: preventing the accretion of unnecessary rules in order to provide the climate for innovation. It would, however, see important macro policy considerations neglected, including the use of data from biometric systems, security, surveillance and the non-material harms of AI content. Further, it is unlikely that the UK would want to diverge too greatly from a common framework; the EU AI Act will provide a blueprint for more detailed regulations.
If the UK government wishes to develop a distinct regulatory framework for AI, it has several challenges going forward:
1) Determining the exact balance in its priorities; and
2) Walking the tightrope between a pro-innovation approach and risk minimisation.
The above analysis shows that the utility and efficacy of AI regulation is determined by a complex series of policy considerations. The UK government could improve on the omissions of the AI Act to maximise the benefits of AI for consumers; it has the freedom to create an AI strategy with regulations addressing sector-specific concerns. This appears to be the best way to maximise the benefits of AI, whilst placing consumers at the forefront. The EU AI Act, in its current format, has not struck the right balance for all stakeholders concerned.
Data Protection
Top 10 Privacy and Data Protection Cases 2023: a selection – Suneet Sharma
Inforrm covered a wide range of data protection and privacy cases in 2023. Following my posts in 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022 here is my selection of notable privacy and data protection cases across 2023. TPP is delighted to repost its annual article on this topic after a haitus.
- Stoute v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2023] EWHC 232 (KB)
Having secured the United Kingdom’s most lucrative government contract for PPE during covid-19, worth £2 billion, a married couple sought an emergency injunction at first instance (and again on appeal), to prevent the publication of photographs of them walking along a public beach, fully dressed (her in a knee-length kaftan, him in board shorts and a polo shirt), on their way to a family lunch at a beach restaurant frequented by celebrities (and paparazzi).(6) The court denied the couple’s application to prevent publication in The Sun of the photographs, over which the court said the couple had no reasonable expectation of privacy.
The Court of Appeal upheld the fact that there was simply no reasonable expectation of privacy in photographs in the circumstances, with some considerable interest placed on the “performative” manner in which the couple arrived at the beach with their larger party by way of loud jet skis from their luxury yacht parked just off-shore.
2. WFZ v BBC [2023] EWHC 1618 (KB)
The applicant, a high-profile man arrested for sexual offences against two women but not charged, sought an interim injunction pending trial to prevent the BBC from publishing his name as part of a broader story concerning the failings in the industry concerned properly to deal with such allegations.(7) The applicant had not yet been named by the mainstream media. The basis for the injunction application was misuse of private information and contempt of court (a novel claim for a private individual to bring).
The High Court held that the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his arrest, indicating that courts are likely to restrain information about arrests as well as investigations (following the Supreme Court’s decision in ZXC) until the suspect is charged. Additionally, though controversially, the court found that having been arrested, publication of the man’s name would likely give rise to a contempt of court such as to justify restraint.
3. Prismall v Google
In the latest attempt to open the floodgates for group data privacy claims, a representative claimant brought a misuse of private information claim against DeepMind and Google on behalf of £1.6 million people arising from the transfer of their NHS medical records.
The claim was struck out by the High Court for failing to show that, on the lowest common denominator basis, all claimants would be able to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data shared and were entitled to more than nominal damages. The claim would have been a means of getting around the finding in Lloyd v Google that there were no recoverable damages in data claims for loss of control of data. The Court of Appeal has granted permission to appeal.
See the comment from the Panopticon Blog.
4. Baroness Lawrence & Ors v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2023] EWHC 2789 (KB)
A summary judgment where the claimants alleged that the Daily Mail, the Mail on Sunday and MailOnline acquire the private or confidential information through unlawful methods including voicemail interception, eavesdropping on calls, deception and use of private investigators. This information was then alleged posted online by the outlets.
The Defendants made an application to challenge the claim on two grounds- limitation; that the claims were made over six years after the misconduct occurred and contesting the use of ledgers from the leveson inquiry of which there were three orders in place.
It was held that each of the claimants had a real prospect of success with reliance on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980. In relation to the orders it was found that the approach needed to be regularised which could be achieved in three ways- (a) by the defendant voluntarily disclosing the Ledgers; (b) the relevant government Minister varying the order; or (c) amending the Particulars of Claim to remove the material from the Ledgers.
There was a 5RB case comment on the case.
5. Duke of Sussex v MGN Ltd [2023] EWHC 3217 (Ch).
Fancourt J held that phone hacking had been habitual and widespread at The Daily Mirror, The Sunday Mirror and The People newspapers from 1998 until 2006, and had continued extensively but on a reducing basis from 2007 until 2011. The editors and in-house legal departments knew it was being used, and the group legal director and CEO had known about or turned a blind eye to it. Although claims by the Duke of Sussex and others for damages for loss caused by publication of their private information obtained by phone hacking and/or other unlawful means were statute-barred, some of their claims for damages for misuse of private information succeeded. When assessing damages, losses flowing from publication of their private information were recoverable as damages for the original unlawful information gathering. 5RB news, has a comment.
6. VB v. Natsionalna agentsia za prihodite (C‑340/21)
A case which clarified the concept of non-material damage under Article 82 of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) and the rules governing burden of proof under the GDPR.
Following a cyber attack against the Bulgarian National Revenue Agency (the “Agency”), one of the more than six million affected individuals brought an action before the Administrative Court of Sofia claiming compensation. In support of that claim, the affected individual argued that they had suffered non-material damage as a result of a personal data breach caused by the Agency’s failure to fulfill its obligations under, inter alia, Articles 5(1)(f), 24 and 32 of the GDPR. The non-material damage claimed consisted of the fear that their personal data, having been published without their consent, might be misused in the future, or that they might be blackmailed, assaulted or even kidnapped.
In its judgment, the CJEU takes the view that the mere fact that a personal data breach occurred does not mean that the Agency did not implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to comply with Articles 24 and 32 of the GDPR. The EU legislator’s intent, as explained by the CJEU, was to “to ‘mitigate’ the risks of personal data breaches, without claiming that it would be possible to eliminate them.” National courts should assess the measures implemented “in a concrete manner, by taking into account the risks associated with the processing concerned and by assessing whether the nature, content and implementation of those measures are appropriate to those risks.”
That said, the CJEU further notes that the fact that an infringement results from the behaviour of a third-party (cyber criminals) does not exempt the controller of liability and that, in the context of an action for compensation under Article 82 of the GDPR, the burden of proving that the implemented technical and organizational measures are appropriate falls on the controller and not on the individual.
Finally, building on its Österreichische Post judgment, the CJEU indicates that the fear experienced by individuals with regard to a possible misuse of their personal data by third parties as a result of an infringement of the GDPR may, in itself, constitute non-material damage. In this respect, the national court is required to verify that the fear can be regarded as well founded, in the specific circumstances at issue for the concerned individual.
7. Delo v Information Commissioner [2023] EWCA Civ 1141
A case which considered the approach to be taken by the Information Commissioner’s approach to complaints made by data subjects. Mr Delo made a data subject access request to Wise Payment Limited to which Wise responded that it was exempt from providing much of the information requested. Upon Mr Delo complaining to the Information Commissioner he was advised that Wise had declined to provide the information sought in keeping with its obligations.
Mr Delo escalated his request by bringing a claim for judicial review and suing Wise.
In finding that Wise had complied with his obligations two matters were clarified by the Court of Appeal as matter which were in the public interest:
1) Is the Commissioner obliged to reach a definitive decision on the merits of each and every complaint or does he have a discretion to decide that some other outcome is appropriate?
(2) If the Commissioner has a discretion, did he nonetheless act unlawfully in this case by declining to investigate or declining to determine the merits of the complaint made by the claimant
Both questions were adjudicated by the Court to be negatives.
Panopticon Blog has an excellent summary of the case.
8. Ali v Chief Constable of Bedfordshire [2023] EWHC 938 (KB)
A informed the police that her husband was a cocaine dealer and a danger to her family, she indicated that she was providing the information on the basis that she would not be identified as a source.
The police informed the local council social services department. However, a malicious council employee informed A’s husband of what A had said.
Whilst the council was not held vicariously liable for the criminal acts of their employee. Her action against Bedford Police succeeded for breaches of the GDPR, misuse of private information and contravention of Article 8 of the ECHR.
For a summary of the case see the Panopticon Blog.
9. Hurbain v Belgium
In 2008 the newspaper placed on its website an electronic version of its archives dating back to 1989 (including the Article). In 2010 Dr G contacted Le Soir, requesting that the article be removed from the newspaper’s electronic archives or at least anonymised. The request mentioned his profession and the fact that the article appeared among the results when his name was entered in several search engines. The newspaper refused to remove the article.
In 2012 Dr G sued Mr Hurbain (in his capacity as editor of Le Soir) to obtain the anonymisation of the article. His action was founded on the right to private life, which (under Belgian law) encompassed a right to be forgotten. Ultimately, the Grand Chamber found that there had been no violation of Article 10, the interference with the right here had been necessary and proportionate.
10. FGX v Gaunt [2023] EWHC 419 (KB)
The covert recording of naked images of the claimant and their publication on a pornographic website gave rise to this claim for (i) intentionally exposing the claimant to a foreseeable risk of injury or severe distress which resulted in injury; (ii) infringement of the claimant’s privacy; and (iii) breach of the claimant’s confidence.
Said to be the first case of its kind in England and Wales, the case resulted in an award of damages in total of £97,041.61.
Privacy Law in Practice – An Insight into Data Protection Law as an In-House IT Lawyer – Madeleine Weber
Welcome to Privacy Law in Practice, our series at TPP demystifying what it is like to practice in privacy law.
Have you ever wondered which data protection law issues come up in practice? It obviously depends on the industry and area you work in, but data protection law might be more prevalent than you think.
Continue readingTop 10 Privacy and Data Protection Cases 2022
Inforrm covered a wide range of data protection and privacy cases in 2022. Following my posts in 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021 here is my selection of notable privacy and data protection cases across 2022.
- ZXC v Bloomberg [2022] UKSC 5
This was the seminal privacy case of the year, decided by the UK Supreme Court. It was considered whether, in general a person under criminal investigation has, prior to being charged, a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of information relating to that investigation.
Continue readingThe Personal Data life cycle: Where to start the analysis? – Vladyslav Tamashev, Privacy lawyer at Legal IT Group
Have you ever thought about data on your computer? It doesn’t matter whether you are a content creator, programmer, or just a regular user thousands of different files were created, downloaded, and altered on your device. But what happens when some of that data becomes useless to you?
Usually, this data will be manually deleted to get some free space on your storage device or it will be wiped during the OS reinstallation. Everything that happened with that data starting from its creation or collection until its destruction is called the data life cycle.
The data life cycle is a sequence of stages that happened to a particular unit of data. The simplified life cycle model has 5 basic stages: Collection, Processing, Retention, Disclosure, Destruction. In practice, when we talk about personal data life cycle, this sequence can be dramatically different, dependant on the type of information, its usage, origin, company policies, personal data protection regulations and legislation.
Continue readingTop 10 Privacy and Data Protection Cases of 2021: A selection – Suneet Sharma
Inforrm covered a wide range of data protection and privacy cases in 2021. Following my posts in 2018, 2019 and 2020 here is my selection of most notable privacy and data protection cases across 2021:
- Lloyd v Google LLC [2021] UKSC 50
In the most significant privacy law judgment of the year the UK Supreme Court considered whether a class action for breach of s4(4) Data Protection Act 1998 (“DPA”) could be brought against Google of its obligations as a data controller for its application of the “Safari Workaround”. The claim for compensation was made under s.13 DPA 1998. The amount claimed per person advanced in the letter of claim was £750. Collectively, with the number of people impacted by the processing, the potential liability of Google was estimated to exceed £3bn.
Lord Leggatt handed down the unanimous judgement in favour of the appellant Google LLC:
“the claim has no real prospect of success. That in turn is because, in the way the claim has been framed in order to try to bring it as a representative action, the claimant seeks damages under section 13 of the DPA 1998 for each individual member of the represented class without attempting to show that any wrongful use was made by Google of personal data relating to that individual or that the individual suffered any material damage or distress as a result of a breach of the requirements of the Act by Google.”
The case has been heralded for its central importance in determining the viability of data protection class actions. The case drew wide coverage from Pinsent Masons, Hill Dickinson, Clifford Chance, Bindmans and Stewarts.
- HRH The Duchess of Sussex v Associated Newspapers Limited [2021] EWHC 273 (Ch) and [2021] EWCA Civ 1810.
In February 2021 Meghan, Duchess of Sussex, won her application for summary judgment against the Mail on Sunday. Warby LJ said there were “compelling reasons” for it not to go to trial over its publication of extracts of a private letter to her estranged father, Thomas Markle. He entered judgment for the Duchess in misuse of private information and copyright. There was a news piece on Inforrm and a piece by Dominic Crossley.
Associated Newspapers was granted permission appeal and the appeal was heard on 9 and 11 November 2021 with judgment being handed down on 2 December 2021, The Court, Sir Geoffrey Vos MR, Sharp P and Bean LJ, unanimously dismissed the appeal on all grounds, stating:
“Essentially, whilst it might have been proportionate to disclose and publish a very small part of the Letter to rebut inaccuracies in the People Article, it was not necessary to deploy half the contents of the Letter as Associated Newspapers did. As the Articles themselves demonstrate, and as the judge found, the primary purpose of the Articles was not to publish Mr Markle’s responses to the inaccurate allegations against him in the People Article. The true purpose of the publication was, as the first 4 lines of the Articles said: to reveal for the first time [to the world] the “[t]he full content of a sensational letter written by [the Duchess] to her estranged father shortly after her wedding”. The contents of the Letter were private when it was written and when it was published, even if the claimant, it now appears, realised that her father might leak its contents to the media.” [106]
The case has been analysed on INFORRM by Brian Cathcart.
- Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Google LLC (No 2) [2021] FCA 367
The Federal Court of Australia found that Google misled some users about the personal location data it collected through Android devices between January 2017 and December 2018.
The Court found that, in providing the option, “Don’t save my Location History in my Google Account”, represented to some reasonable consumers that they could prevent their location data being saved on their Google Account. In actual fact, users need to change an additional setting, separate, to stop their location data being saved to their Google Account.
- Hájovský v. Slovakia [2021] ECHR 591
Mr Hájovský placed an anonymous advert in a national newspaper offering payment to a woman in return for giving birth to his child. An investigative reporter posed as a candidate interested in surrogacy, replied to the advert and secretly filmed the ensuing meetings. These were later complied into a documentary. A national tabloid also covered the story using stills of footage and taking a critical stance of the applicants’ actions. Both stories revealed the applicant’s identity. This prompted the applicant to bring an action against the media groups for violation of his privacy under Slovakian law.
The Slovakian courts dismissed the application on the basis that the article contributed to a matter of public interest- the debate around surrogacy for payment and in any event the publishing of the advert had brought a private matter, the applicant’s wish to have a child, into the public domain.The ECtHR found in favour of the applicant. In doing so it reiterated the well-established balancing approach vis a vi privacy and freedom of expression as per Von Hannover and Axel Springer. In this instance the court found that the applicants right to privacy had been violated and that the Slovakian courts has erred in their approach to balancing the competing rights. In doing so the court make key observations about the privacy implications of photographs.
- Warren v DSG Retail Ltd [2021] EWHC 2168 (QB)
This case concerned the viability of claims for breach of confidence and misuse of private information against data controllers who have suffered cyber-attacks. In dismissing the claims for breach of confidence and misuse of private information Saini J found that both causes require some form of “positive conduct” by the defendant that is lacking where the cause of the private information being leaked is a cyber-attack.
6. ES v Shillington 2021 ABQB 739
In this case the Alberta Court of the Queen’s Bench awarded damages under new “public disclosure of private fact” tort. The case concerned the making public of images of the claimant engaging in sex acts with the defendant- these had been shared during a romantic relationship between 2005 to 2016 where the parties had two children together. The parties had a mutual understanding that the images would not be shared or published anywhere. However, the defendant then proceeded to share the images online, including those involving the sexual assault of the claimant.
Delivering judgment for the claimant, Inglis J accepted their submissions that a new “public disclosure of private information” tort should be recognised as a separate cause of action from existing common law statutes.
Inforrm has a case comment.
- Hurbain v Belgium ([2021] ECHR 544)
A case in which an order to anonymise a newspaper’s electronic archive was found not to breach the applicant publisher’s right to freedom of expression. This case reflects an important application of the right to be forgotten under article 8 of the Convention. The applicant, Patrick Hurbain, is the president of the Rossel Group which owns one of Belgium’s leading French-language newspapers, Le Soir, of which he was previously Managing Editor. The article in question concerned a series of fatal car accidents and named one of the drivers, G, who had been convicted of a criminal offence for his involvement in the incidents. G made a successful application for rehabilitation in 2006.
However, Le Soir created a free, electronic, searchable version of its archives from 1989 onwards, including the article at issue. G relied on the fact that the article appeared in response to a search on his name on Le Soir’s internal search engine and on Google Search. He explained that its availability was damaging to his reputation, particularly in his work as a doctor. The newspaper refused the application by stated it had asked Google to delist/deindex the article.
In 2012 G sued Mr Hurbain as editor of Le Sior and was successful domestically. Mr Hurbain then lodged an application with the Strasbourg Court complaining that the anonymisation order was a breach of Article 10. In balancing the article 8 and 10 rights in the case the Strasbourg Court found in favour of G.
Informm had a case comment.
- Peters v Attorney-General on behalf of Ministry of Social Development [2021] NZCA 355
The New Zealand Court of Appeal provided guidance in respect of the tort of invasion of privacy in this high-profile case. In 2017, the Ministry for Social Development (“MSD”) realised that Mr Peters, MP and leader of the New Zealand First Party, had overpaid New Zealand Superannuation (“NZS”). Due to errors NZS had been paid at the single rate when it should have been paid at the partner rate. Mr Peters immediately arranged for the overpaid amount to be repaid.
In August 2017 several reporters received anonymous calls in respect of the overpayment. To pre-empt any publicity, Mr Peters released a press statement addressing the incident. He also issued a claim for infringement of the tort of invasion of privacy against several MSD executives. The High Court found the MSD executives were proper recipients of information and thus the claim failed. The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Peters’ appeal. For an invasion of privacy claim to succeed there is a two “limb” test:
- the existence of facts in respect of which there was a reasonable expectation of privacy; and
- that the publicity given to those private facts would be considered highly offensive to an objective reasonable person.
The Court agreed that limb one was met on the facts. However, the Court found that Mr Peters did not have a reasonable expectation of protection from disclosure of this information within MSD and from MSD to the relevant Ministers and select staff. As the claimant could not prove that any of defendants had released information to the media. The appeal was dismissed. The case affirmed the removal of the requirement for there to be widespread disclosure and the potential for the removal of the requirement that disclosure be highly offensive.
- R (Open Rights Group and the 3 million) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Others [2021] EWCA Civ 800,
A case concerning “the lawfulness” immigration exemption found in paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act 2018. This exemption allows those processing personal data for immigration control purposes to refuse to comply with the data subject rights guaranteed by the GDPR to the extent that complying with those provisions would prejudice those purposes. The Court of Appeal found that this exemption was not compliant with Article 23 of the GDPR.
There was coverage from Hunton Andrews Kurth and 11KBW.
- Biancardi v. Italy [2021] ECHR 972
The ECtHR found that an order that the editor of an online newspaper was liable for failing to de-index an article concerning criminal proceedings did not breach Article 10 of the Convention. The case concerned an application for the delisting of an article concerning a fight involving a stabbing in a restaurant which mentioned the names of the those involved including the applicant V.X.
Suneet Sharma is a junior legal professional with a particular interest and experience in media, information and privacy law. He is the editor of The Privacy Perspective blog.
ICO launches consultation on the Draft Journalism Code of Practice
The ICO’s consultation on its Draft Journalism Code of Practice has begun.
Be sure to have your say- the deadline to submit responses is 22 January 2022.
The Code covers privacy safeguards among many other topics. In particular, it covers the journalism exemption under the Data Protection Act 2018 and its broad exemption that disapplies requirements to holding and processing data.
Journalism should be balanced with other rights that are also
at p.4
fundamentally important to democracy, such as data protection and the
right to privacy.
The Code substantively addresses the safeguarding of journalism under the exemption, briefly touching on balancing a free press against privacy rights before going on to discuss how this balance is struck under data protection laws:
Why is it important to balance journalism and privacy?
It is widely accepted that a free press, especially a diverse press, is a
fundamental component of a democracy.It is associated with strong and
important public benefits worthy of special protection. This in itself is a public
interest.Most obviously, a free press plays a vital role in the free flow of
communications in a democracy. It increases knowledge, informs debates
and helps citizens to participate more fully in society. All forms of journalistic
content can perform this crucial role, from day-to-day stories about local
events to celebrity gossip to major public interest investigations.A free press is also regarded as a public watch-dog. It acts as an important
check on political and other forms of power, and in particular abuses of
power. In this way, it helps citizens to hold the powerful to account.However, the right to freedom of expression and information should be
balanced with other rights that are necessary in a democratic society, such
as the right to privacy. The public interest in individual freedom of expression
is itself an aspect of a broader public interest in the autonomy, integrity and
dignity of individuals.The influence and power of the press in society, and the reach of the
internet, means that it is particularly important to balance journalism and
people’s right to privacy.This code provides guidance about balancing these two important rights by
at p.25
helping you to understand what data protection law requires and how to
comply with these requirements effectively.
Quotes from caselaw 3: Fairhurst v Woodard (Case No: G00MK161) – A cautionary tale for neigbours implementing surveillance
“I am satisfied that the
extent of range to which these devices can capture audio is well beyond the
range of video that they capture, and in my view cannot be said to be
reasonable for the purpose for which the devices are used by the Defendant,
since the legitimate aim for which they are said to be used, namely crime
prevention, could surely be achieved by something less. A great deal of the
purpose could be achieved without audio at all, as is the case with the bulk
of CCTV systems in use in public places in this country, or by a microphone that only picks up sound within a small diameter of the device.Melissa Clarke HHJ. at p.137
That finding means that I am satisfied that the processing of such audio
data by the Defendant as data controller is not lawful. The extent of the
range means that personal data may be captured from people who are not
even aware that the device is there, or that it records and processes audio
personal data, or that it can do so from such a distance away, in breach of
the first principle.”
In Fairhurst a neighbour complained that use of several cameras, including a Ring doorbell, amounted to nusiance, harassment and breach of the Data Protection Act 2018.
The claims of harassment and data protection succeeded. It was, in particular, noted that the audio recording capabilities of the devices were much broader in than the video recording capability. As the above quote shows, the extent processing of the audio recording data was such that it was unlawful under data protection laws.
The audio recording capability of the Ring device extended 40-68ft (12-20m).
Amazon released a statement following the finding in the case: “We strongly encourage our customers to respect their neighbours’ privacy and comply with any applicable laws when using their Ring product.”
The case serves as a cautionary tale for those seeking to implement surveillance around their homes that impinge upon their neighbours.
INFORRM has an excellent case comment for interested readers. As does the Guardian.
Privacy Law Monthly Round Up – September 2021
Headlines
Ben and Deborah Stokes’ privacy claim against The Sun for the highly intrusive article detailing traumatic events in the Stokes’ family past was settled on 30 August 2021, with the newspaper agreeing to publish an apology and pay substantial damages. Paul Wragg wrote about The Sun’s “nonsensical” defence for the Inforrm Blog, concluding that the only party spared the anguish of trial was the newspapers’ defence team.
Government and General legislative developments
The controversial Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill had its second reading in the House of Lords this month. The Bill is notorious for its proposed restrictions on peaceful protest, which critics have predicted will have a discriminatory impact and breach the rights to freedom of expression and assembly. Broadened police powers would also enable the extraction of more information from mobile phones.
The Age Appropriate Design Code (aka the “Children’s Code”) entered into force on 2 September 2021 following a one year transition period. The Children’s Code explains to businesses how the UK GDPR, Data Protection Act and Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations apply to the design and delivery of Information Society Services (“ISS”) – i.e social media, educational and gaming platforms – apply to children. The Children’s Code is the first of its kind worldwide, and has been welcomed by many as a positive development for keeping children safe online. The 15 standards that the Code sets can be found here.
Sticking with child safety online, Home Secretary Priti Patel launched a Safety Tech Challenge fund at the G7 meeting start of this month. Five applicants will be awarded up to £85,000 each to develop new technologies that enable to detection of child sexual abuse material online, without breaking end-to-end encryption.
The UK Government has launched a public consultation on data protection legislation reform following Brexit entitled Data: A new direction. The consultation is open until 19 November. Following the end of the Brexit transition period, the UK’s data protection regime, which had derived from the EU framework, will be transposed into domestic law known as the UK GDPR. The Government is seeking to use this opportunity to make some changes to the current regime. The Hawtalk Blog discusses how some of these proposals are unethical and unsafe. Further discussion can be found on the Panopticon Blog and the Data Protection report.
Data Privacy and Data Protection
Cressida Dick, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, has accused tech giants of undermining terrorist prevention efforts by virtue of their focus on end-to-end encryption. Writing in The Telegraph on the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, she said that it is “impossible in some cases” for the police to fulfil their role to protect the public. Given the pressure on tech giants to ensure users’ privacy, companies are unlikely to reshape their platforms to facilitate more extensive monitoring.
Apple has delayed its plan to scan its users’ iCloud images for child sexual abuse material. The proposed detection technology would compare images before they are uploaded to iCloud against unique “digital fingerprints” of known child pornographic material maintained by the National Centre for Missing and Exploited Children. The plan was criticised by privacy groups because it involved using an individual’s own device to check if they were potentially engaged in criminal activity.
Surveillance
The Metropolitan Police have invested £3 million into new facial recognition technologies (FRT) that will greatly increase surveillance capabilities in the capital. The expansion of the Met’s technology will enable it to process historic images from CCTV feeds, social media and other sources in order to track down suspects. Critics argue that such FRT encroaches on privacy by “turning back the clock to see who you are, where you’ve been, what you have done and with whom, over many months or even years.” There is also concern that FRT can exacerbate existing racial discrimination in the criminal justice system. The UK’s Surveillance Camera Commissioner (SCC), Professor Fraser Sampson, has acknowledged that some FRT “are so ethically fraught” that it may only be appropriate to carry them out under license in the future.
NGO’s
Big Brother Watch published an opinion piece warning that the imposition of vaccine passports could reorganise Britain into a two-tier, checkpoint society. The article responds to the Scottish Parliament’s vote in favour of vaccine passports earlier this month. Wales has since followed Scotland and announced mandatory vaccination and COVID status check schemes. The English government has not yet committed to such a regime. The ICO has emphasised that data protection laws will not stand in the way of mandatory vaccination and COVID status checks, but rather facilitate responsible sharing of personal data where it is necessary to protect public health.
Privacy International has considered how data-intensive systems and surveillance infrastructure, developed by national and foreign actors, in Afghanistan as part of developmental and counter-terrorism measures will fare under the Taliban regime.
From the regulator
ICO
The ICO has announced two fines this month;
- A total of £495,000 was imposed against We Buy Any Car, Saga, and Sports Direct for sending more than 354 million “frustrating and intrusive” nuisance messages between them. None of the companies had permission to send recipients marketing emails or texts, making their behaviour illegal;
- The Glasgow-based company DialADeal Scotland Ltd was fined £150,000 for the making of more than 500,000 nuisance marketing calls to recipients who had not given their permission to receive them.
The ICO has also released a communiqué from a meeting on data protection and privacy held by the G7 authorities at the start of the month. The meeting is closely aligned with the Roadmap for Cooperation on Data Free Flow with Trust announced by G7 Digital and Technology Ministers on 28 April 2021.
IPSO
IPSO has published a number of privacy rulings and resolutions;
- 03134-21 Price v Hereford Times, 2 Privacy (2019), 4 Intrusion into grief or shock (2019), No breach – after investigation
- 03066-21 Brian and Declan Arthurs v Sunday World, 2 Privacy (2019), 4 Intrusion into grief or shock (2019), Breach – sanction: publication of adjudication
- 08086-19 ESE Group and EVO Energy Solutions v Daily Mirror, 1 Accuracy (2019), 2 Privacy (2019) Breach – sanction: publication of adjudication
- 01778-21 Evison v examinerlive.co.uk, 5 Reporting suicide (2019), 4 Intrusion into grief or shock (2019), 2 Privacy (2019), 1 Accuracy (2019), 12 Discrimination (2019), 14 Confidential sources (2019), 6 Children (2019), 3 Harassment (2019), No breach – after investigation
- 05769-21 Lewis v essexlive.news, 4 Intrusion into grief or shock (2019), 6 Children (2019), 2 Privacy (2019), 1 Accuracy (2019), No breach – after investigation
- 04489-21 Symmonds v Swindon Advertiser, 2 Privacy (2019), No breach – after investigation
- 28414-20 Steshov v The Daily Telegraph, 1 Accuracy (2019), 14 Confidential sources (2019), 2 Privacy (2019), No breach – after investigation
- 00252-21 Cohen v basingstokegazette.co.uk, 1 Accuracy (2019), 2 Privacy (2019), 6 Children (2019), 9 Reporting of crime (2019), No breach – after investigation
- 00251-21 Cohen v Andover Advertiser, 1 Accuracy (2019), 2 Privacy (2019), 6 Children (2019), 9 Reporting of crime (2019), No breach – after investigation
IMPRESS
There were no IMPRESS rulings relating to privacy this month.
Cases
The Inforrm Blog has published an article detailing the continued decline in privacy injunction applications in England and Wales for 2021. There were only three applications in the first six months of the year, down from ten in 2020. All three applications were successful. Only 4% of the new issued cases on the Media and Communications List related to misuse of private information or breach of privacy.
No judgements relating to privacy have been handed down this month.
Written by Colette Allen
Colette Allen has hosted “Newscast’” on The Media Law Podcast with Dr Thomas Bennett and Professor Paul Wragg since 2018. She has recently finished the BTC at The Inns of Court College of Advocacy and will be starting a MSc in the Social Sciences of the Internet at the University of Oxford in October 2021.
Healthcare data and data protection in the time of coronavirus – Olivia Wint
The processing of special category personal data (including health data e.g. vaccination status, blood type, health conditions etc) was a common topic before the COVID-19 pandemic (the “pandemic”), with various resources published that explored this topic.
For example, the European Data Protection Board (“EDPB”) published an adopted opinion on the interplay between the Clinical Trials Regulation and the General Data Protection Regulation* (“GDPR”) (23January 2019), the Information Commissioner’s Office (“ICO”) posted a blog on why special category personal data needs to be handled even more carefully (14 November 2019) and the ICO published guidance on the lawful basis for processing special category data compliance with the GDPR (November 2019).
The pandemic has brought about a number of data protection considerations, all of which were already in existence but exacerbated by the pandemic (employee monitoring, contact tracing, workforce shift from office to home etc.) One that is more prevalent than ever before is the processing of health data, this piece aims to cover some key data protection themes and practical insights into the processing of health data.
Health data, a subset of special category personal data by its very nature comes with an increased risk profile. When processing this data type, not only are there legislative data protection requirements, the expectation of good clinical governance practices but also regulatory body considerations too.
For example, the NHS Care Quality Commission have in place a code of practice on confidential personal information, the NHS Health Research Authority have in place GDPR guidance specifically for researchers and study coordinators and technical guidance for those responsible for information governance within their organisation and the NHS more generally, has in place it’s Data Security and Protection Toolkit (the “Toolkit”). The Toolkit is an online self-assessment tool that enables organisations to measure and publish their performance against the National Data Guardian’s ten data security standards. The Toolkit covers records management and retention, training and awareness, system vulnerability management and crisis management to name a few.
The above is all on a national level (UK), on an international level, there are data protection laws which specifically cover health data such as HIPAA in the US, the Patient Data Protection Act in Germany, and various provincial health data privacy laws in Canada such as the Health Information Act in Alberta.
Whilst the previous paragraph highlights the complexities of processing health data whether on a national and international level in comparison to other data types, there are a number of mitigations that organisations can put in place to adequately reduce the risks associated with processing this type of data. Mitigations such as Data Protection Impact Assessments (“DPIAs”), updated privacy notices and appropriate security measures amongst other things should all be considered.

Many organisations that never historically processed health data may now do so as a result of the pandemic…
Covering your bases
The first base that must be covered when processing data is ensuring that an appropriate legal basis has been established for each data processing activity, so for example if health data is processed for employee monitoring and research, a legal basis for both of these activities will need to be established. Legal bases can include for the performance of a contract, for legitimate interests** of the organisation and/or in order to perform a legal obligation. Where processing of health data is concerned an additional category under Article 9 of the UK GDPR must be met. In the healthcare context, applicable additional categories may include explicit consent, health or social care purposes, public health purposes and/or archiving research and statistical purposes.
Many organisations that never historically processed health data may now do as a result of the pandemic or alternatively organisations that processed health data pre-pandemic may now be doing so in larger amounts, organisations that fit either side of the coin should also assess the extent to which their privacy notice(s) have been updated and/or need to be updated in order to make data subjects aware any applicable data processing changes and to comply with transparency obligations.
Next, large scale processing of health data may pose a ‘high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons’ and in such cases, will trigger the requirement of a DPIA. In order for a DPIA to have value, it is important for organisations to ensure that the DPIA is assessed and considered early on to ensure privacy by design and default is incumbent of any system or processing activity.
A DPIA will assess the likelihood and severity of harm related to the processing activity in question and should the DPIA identify a high risk with no available mitigations, consultation with the ICO will be needed. The ICO has set out a 9-step lifecycle for the DPIA, all of which should be considered before any data processing has taken place:
- Identify a need for a DPIA;
- Describe the processing;
- Consider consultation;
- Assess necessity and proportionality;
- Identify and assess risks;
- Identify measures to mitigate risk;
- Sign off and record outcomes;
- Integrate outcomes into plan; and
- Keep under review.
Internally, organisations should have appropriate technical and organisational measures in place which reflects the risk presented. In relation to technical measures, appropriate internal controls and security measures should be utilised. Organisations may wish to consider a myriad and combination of controls to ensure that health data has the best level of protection, this may include end to end encryption for data both in transit and at rest, role-based access within organisations and the adoption and accreditation of industry recognised security standards such as ISO 27001.
In respect of organisational measures, it may be apt for training and awareness sessions to be implemented with tailored training administered to employees that will doing data processing activities and a robust policy suite in place which covers key circumstances such as data breaches and business continuity.
Data sharing
A specific data processing activity that may be utilised more in the wake of the pandemic is that of data sharing between organisations for information and research purposes. In the England, the soon to be implemented GP Data Sharing Scheme aims to improve and create a new framework for creating a central NHS digital database from GP records and the UK’s Department of Health and Social Care (“DHSC”) has recently published a draft policy paper titled ‘Data saves lives: reshaping health and social care with data’. The policy covers the aspiration of the DHSC to introduce new legislation as part of the Health and Care Bill (currently at Committee stage) to encourage data sharing between private health providers and the NHS and have more guard rails around the sharing of data generally through mandating standards for how data is collected and stored.
With data sharing as evidenced by the above, is something that will be advocated for and welcomed in due course, it is important that organisations have in place the appropriate contractual and practical measures to protect data as data in motion is when it is most vulnerable. Contractual measures include ensuring data sharing and/or transfer agreements are in place which cover all necessary contractual provisions and provide adequate assurances as to the data sharing/transfer arrangements. The NHSX has published a template Data Sharing Agreement which has been labelled as suitable for use by all health and care organisations and includes risk management, legal basis and confidentiality and privacy provisions amongst other things. Practical measures include conducting due diligence checks on all organisations which may be in receipt of data as part of the data sharing process (including third parties) and anonymising/ pseudonymising data. The ICO has put in place a comprehensive data sharing checklist which invites organisations to consider data minimisation, accountability and data subject rights.
The pandemic has changed the world that we knew it in more ways than one and in the context of processing of health data, what seems to be certain is that the processing of health data is on the rise. As such, organisations should continue to monitor guidance and developments in this area and ensure data protection principles are at the core of all data processing activities as a first port of call.
* EDPB guidelines are no longer directly relevant to the UK data protection regime and are not binding under the UK regime.
** A legitimate interest assessment should be considered when relying on legitimate interest as a lawful basis.
Olivia Wint is a seasoned data protection professional, with over five years experience in this area. Olivia has worked in a range of sectors including local authority, third sector, start-ups and the Big 4 advising on all aspects of data protection compliance.